Creation of the system of contractual savings for housing in Belarus by Chubrik, Alexander et al.
 
GERMAN ECONOMIC TEAM IN BELARUS 
76 Zakharova Str., 220088 Minsk, Belarus. Tel./fax: +375 (17) 236 1147, 236 4395 
E-mail: bmer@ipm.by. Internet: http://research.by/ 
 
 
PP/04/05 
 
Creation of the System of Contractual Savings for Housing in Belarus 
 
Summary 
Housing conditions in Belarus are similar to those in neighboring countries, but much 
worse than in developed countries. One of the key elements for successfully overcom-
ing the problem of housing quantity and quality is a well-functioning system for fi-
nancing housing. Creating such a system is of crucial importance for Belarus. One im-
portant component of a housing finance system is a contractual savings for housing 
(CSH) scheme. A law “On Contractual Savings for Housing” has recently been drafted. 
It defines all the major components of the future system, but contains several impor-
tant drawbacks. Firstly, it limits competition between housing savings banks and does 
not allow private banks to operate in the CSH system. Secondly, it does not create in-
centives for banks to take part in the CSH system. Thirdly, it does not solve the prob-
lems related to volatile inflation. Fourthly, the government subsidy calculation mecha-
nism is much too complicated for households. In this paper we propose ways of over-
coming these drawbacks. Firstly, in order to create proper incentives for the banks 
and to promote competition between them, the banks should be allowed to make any 
type of contract approved by the supervision. Secondly, in order to reduce the risks 
associated with high and volatile inflation the draft law should envisage the possibility 
of linking the loan interest rates to the refinancing rate. If a bank chooses this kind of 
contract it could revise the loan interest rate once every year. Thirdly, the size, the 
maximum amount, and the schedule of state subsidy payments should be clearly de-
fined in the legislation. 
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1. Introduction 
Housing conditions in Belarus are typical for a post-soviet country in Europe. The total 
floor space per person was 21.9 m2 in 2002, similar to neighboring countries. For in-
stance, in Ukraine this indicator is 21.6 m2 (in 2003), in Russia 20.0 m2 (2002), and in 
Latvia 23.9 m2 (2003). However, this is much lower than in developed European coun-
tries. For example, in Germany (former territory of the Federal Republic) the average 
person occupies more than 40 m2 of floor space1. There are two major reasons for this 
discrepancy: the difference in household incomes and the limited access to financial 
resources and the high cost of housing loans in Belarus. The first item is related to 
general economic policy and to the historical heritage of the country and cannot be 
overcome in the medium term. The second problem could be solved through an ap-
propriate policy aimed at creating a sound system of housing finance. 
Currently, housing construction funds in Belarus derive mainly from bank loans, from 
central and local government resources, and from enterprises. Households finance 
less than 40%. Total housing loans amounted to about USD 200 to 250 m (1% of 
GDP) in 2004. About 3/4 of all housing loans for households are issued at preferential 
interest rates. The governments spend a rather large amount of their resources to 
compensate for bank losses caused by issuing loans at preferential rates: for the year 
2004 the general government had planned to spend about USD 46 m, or 5.6% of all 
investment on dwelling construction. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these outlays 
is doubtful: more than 500,000 families are now registered for improving their hous-
ing conditions, and their number decreases very slowly. Moreover, as housing loans 
are long-term loans, the banks should have long-term funds available to issue such 
loans. But more than 90% of all households deposits in the banking system are short-
term, and institutions of long-term financing such as pension funds or life insurance 
are underdeveloped or do not exist in the country. Hence, creation of a system of 
long-term housing finance is of crucial importance to Belarus. One possible component 
of a long-term housing finance system is a system of contractual savings for housing2. 
This paper analyzes the possibility of introducing a CSH system in Belarus. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the general problem high and 
volatile inflation, being a major challenge for creating a CSH system in Belarus, is dis-
cussed. The third section briefly describes the main provisions of the draft law “On 
Contractual Savings for Housing”, which contain certain drawbacks and needs to be 
improved. In the fourth section the main drawbacks of the draft law are analyzed and 
proposals for overcoming them are made. The final section reiterates the main conclu-
sions and provides a summary of recommendations. 
2. High and volatile inflation as a key challenge for a Belarusian CSH system 
One of the basic features of contracts in a system of housing finance is their long-term 
nature. The main problem with any long-term contract is uncertainty. In a contractual 
savings case, typical (Bauspar-type) contracts provide certainty for households by fix-
ing the interest rates (both for loans and deposits) in nominal terms at the beginning 
of the contract. However, for such a system to function stable and predictable inflation 
is one of the major preconditions. 
Inflation and nominal interest rates in Belarus have been quite unstable over the re-
cent past (Figure 1). Moreover, between 1997 and 2000 inflation exceeded the inter-
est rate, i.e., the real interest rates were negative, which is destructive for any finan-
cial system. At present the situation is improved, but this may change again. 
                                                 
1 Data sources: Ministry of Statistics and Analysis of Belarus, State Statistical Committee of Ukraine, Federal Statistical 
Office of Germany, Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, Federal State Statistics Service of Russia. 
2 A comprehensive analysis of contractual savings schemes is presented in policy paper PP/13/04 “The Implementation 
of Contract Savings Schemes for Housing (Bausparen) in Belarus – Features, Recommendations and Examples”, see 
http://ipm.by/pdf/pp1304e.pdf. 
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Figure 1. Inflation and nominal interest rates 
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Sources: NBB, Ministry of Statistics and Analysis. 
In the case of Belarus, fixing the interest rates at the beginning of long-term contracts 
presents several risks for depositors and banks alike. In order to illustrate the prob-
lem, let’s look at two scenarios: 
a) Money deposited at the end of 1996 for a 4-year period (at a nominal interest rate 
of 34.8% per annum) would have been worth 89% less in real terms at the end of 
the contract term, since inflation for this period was 2896.7%. The value of a loan 
made for the same period would have decreased by 83% (the loan interest rate at 
the end of 1996 was 50.4%). This is known as the risk of inflation acceleration. It 
hurts the saver. 
b) Money deposited at the end of 2000 for a 4-year period (at a nominal interest rate 
of 75.6% per annum) would have been worth 172% more in real terms at the end 
of the contract term. Similarly the value of a loan would have risen by 220% over 
the same period. This is the risk of disinflation, which is harmful to banks. 
Thus, unstable and volatile inflation undermine the incentives of banks and depositors 
to invest money in long-term assets for the following reasons. Firstly, it can lead to 
substantial losses in wealth for both sides of the contract. Secondly, the uncertainty 
associated with unstable inflation creates liquidity management problems, for both 
households and financial institutions, and makes savings unattractive. 
A CSH system is designed to operate in a low and stable inflationary environment. The 
obstacles caused by high and volatile inflation cannot be removed except by decreas-
ing and stabilizing the inflationary environment. Until this is done, the potential of any 
CSH system is rather limited. 
3. The draft law “On Contractual Savings for Housing” 
In order to try to solve the problem of housing financing in Belarus, the Ministry of Ar-
chitecture drew up a law, called “On contractual savings for housing”. It has already 
been discussed within several interested ministries and organizations, such as the 
Ministry of Finance, the National Bank, etc. The Ministry of Architecture is now revis-
ing this draft law based on the input received from these organizations. We will now 
review the main features of the draft law3. 
                                                 
3 As contained in the version of August 2004. 
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3.1. Authorized financial institutions 
The types of financial institutions that would be able to operate in the contractual sav-
ings for housing field are defined in the draft law. They are universal banks that have 
a license to receive household deposits and whose control stock is owned by the state. 
Currently, only 6 out of 32 banks meet these requirements, but only 4 of the 6 are se-
rious candidates. Priorbank (which is one of the most active agents of the current 
housing finance system) and Belvneshekonombank have less than 50% state owner-
ship. According to the draft law, the list of the banks allowed to operate in the CSH 
system is determined by the Council of Ministers and the NBB. The draft law also 
states that the number of banks simultaneously operating in the CSH system should 
be not less than three. 
3.2. The type of system 
There is no clear definition of the type of proposed CSH system in the draft law. The 
law envisages that not only deposits by households – participants of the CSH system 
– and funds obtained from principal and interest payments deriving from housing 
loans are sources for housing loans, but also other funds and incomes of the bank. 
Thus, the CSH system proposed in the draft law can be considered an open one4. 
3.3. Interest rate level 
The deposit interest rate is intended to be set at the level of long-term deposits inter-
est rate, and that at the moment of depositing the money. Usually interests for CSH 
system contracts are below the market rate in order to provide participants with rela-
tively cheap loans. According to the draft law the loan interest is set at the refinancing 
rate level at the moment of issuing the loan. 
3.4. Government subsidies 
According to the draft law, the government will provide support for all households that 
participate in the system. The following formula is proposed in the draft law for its cal-
culation: 
Premium = inflation – deposit interest rate + 6 percentage points. 
This means that the government subsidy (premium) should provide a real yield for 
deposits at 6% per annum. In the draft law inflation is defined as the regional price 
index for contractual work. As of the end of 2004, the premium would be equal to ap-
proximately 24.6% – 19% + 6% = 11.6% per annum5. 
In order to avoid an excessive burden on the state’s expenditures, a maximum yearly 
deposit per household subject to subsidization is proposed. Its level is equal to 2600 
rubles in 1991 prices. The “1991 prices” definition is used only in the construction. 
3.5. Principles of supervision 
Banks participating in the CSH system (housing savings banks) are supervised by the 
NBB according to the banking legislation, as they are universal banks and participation 
in the contractual savings schemes is one of their activities. A specific feature of the 
supervision is that it should insure that the deposits (according to the inflation defini-
tion in the draft law) are not decreased in real terms. Any penalty paid by a housing 
savings bank must be paid from its after-tax profit. It is not permitted to use re-
sources obtained from its depositors for this purpose. 
                                                 
4 An open CSH system usually involves universal commercial banks that can use housing deposits to issue non-housing 
loans and non-housing deposits for housing loans. Interest rates on deposits in an open system are flexible. The most 
well known example of an open CSH system is the French Epargne Logement system. 
5 More precisely, the formula is: premium = (1.246/1.19)*1.06*100 = 11.0%. 
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4. Drawbacks of the draft law; and a CSH system appropriate for Belarus 
The CSH law should create a general legislative framework only, issues of interest rate 
levels, supervision, government subsidies, etc. should be defined by regulations issued 
by the NBB, the Ministry of Finance, or other government bodies responsible for such 
issues. The Belarusian draft law is too detailed, which makes the legislative framework 
too rigid. Should some amendments to the CSH system become necessary in future, it 
would be much easier to amend the regulations of the NBB, etc., than to amend the law. 
The draft law has a number of less “general” drawbacks6, too. First of all, it reduces 
the competition within the CSH system by limiting the number of banks that can si-
multaneously operate within it and by the government stock ownership requirement. 
Secondly, an open system is less transparent and more difficult to monitor than a 
closed one. For the undeveloped Belarusian financial market, this puts an important 
burden on the system’s development. Thirdly, one of the main problems of the ana-
lyzed version of the draft law is its method of interest rate setting. To predetermine 
the interest rate level at the refinancing rate limits the competition between banks, 
while the proposal to set the CSH deposits interest rates at long-term deposits inter-
est levels undermines the incentives for banks to take part in the system, as these 
levels are higher than the refinancing rate. Finally, the proposed system is too compli-
cated for households, as it uses a very complex algorithm for calculating the govern-
ment premium. In the following sections we set forth our recommendations for elimi-
nating the drawbacks of the current draft law. 
4.1. Balance sheet segregation of CSH operations 
The question of what type of financial institutions should be allowed to operate within 
the CSH system has two dimensions. The first (more general) is related to the type of 
these institutions – should they be like the German Bausparkassen (i.e. specialized 
ones) or universal. The second (concerning the Belarusian draft law) asks whether 
they should be state or privately owned, and whether their number should be limited. 
The current legislation (the Banking Code of Belarus) does not allow the establishment 
of specialized financial institutions. Moreover, the NBB opposes the introduction of 
specialized financial institutions (for fear that they might lack liquidity in the long 
term). For this reason universal banks are the only available institutions for Belarus’ 
CSH system. But since a CSH system operated by a universal bank lacks transpar-
ency, the CSH operations of housing savings banks should be shown as segregated 
parts of their balance sheet. 
The limits on the number of financial institutions allowed to participate in the CSH sys-
tem and the stipulation that these institutions be majority state-owned should both be 
eliminated. They restrict competition and leave no room for private banks to take part 
in the CHS system. 
4.2. Open versus closed systems 
Sources for housing loans should only be resources earned within and allocated to 
CSH operations. The investment guidelines for CSH activities should be clearly defined 
by the law. A good example for this practice is the German Law on Housing Savings 
Banks. But as the Belarusian financial market is much less developed than the Ger-
man one, the NBB together with the Ministry of Finance may want to establish special 
investment guidelines for the Belarusian housing savings banks. 
                                                 
6 Since we are considering the August 2004 draft law version, the purpose of the paper is to contribute to the ongoing 
process of revising the draft law. The essentials of this paper and the draft law had already been raised during the 
round table discussion on “Problems and Perspectives of Contractual Savings for Housing System Creation in Belarus” 
held under the auspices of the Institute for Privatization and Management and the German Economic Team in Belarus 
on October 21, 2004. 
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4.3. Interest Rates: Liquidity management under volatile inflation 
The consequences of the interest rate setting proposal in the draft law should be re-
considered. In the recent past, the interest rate for deposits with maturities above 1 
year, which can be seen as a proxy for the long-term deposit interest rate (the deposit 
interest rate in the CSH system according to the draft law) has been higher than the 
refinancing rate (the loan interest rate in the CSH system according to the draft law), 
as shown in Figure 2. If the interest spread of any market segment is negative, banks 
have no incentive to operate in this segment (ceteris paribus). The only thing that may 
create an “incentive” is a direct order from the authorities supported by compensation 
for bank losses. Evidently, such a solution cannot create a sound CHS system. 
Figure 2. Spread between the interest rates for deposits 
with maturities above 1 year and the refinancing rate of the NBB 
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Source: NBB. 
The principle of interest rate setting considered above has an additional negative con-
sequence: it leaves no room for competition between banks in their interest policy. 
Besides, it provides no solution for the problem of volatile inflation. Evidently, these 
and other limitations that make participation in the CSH system unattractive for banks 
(or households) should be eliminated. 
Hence, an appropriate solution should deal with the problem of volatile (over the long-
term) inflation and allow banks to implement competitive interest policies. For these 
purposes we propose to envisage the possibility to link the nominal loan interest rate 
to the refinancing rate. The law should not make this link mandatory, however. The 
nominal interest rate could be revised once a year (e.g. at the end of the year) and 
then be fixed for the next year. This measure would somewhat reduce the uncertainty 
by creating clear expectations of the direction and scale of interest rate changes, as 
well as the other risks of high/volatile inflation. In addition, the banks should be al-
lowed to make fixed interest rate contracts for the whole term of the contract. These 
measures would give banks incentives to participate in the CSH system and compete 
for the clients through interest rate policies. Additionally, households would get more 
certain contract conditions and lower the risks caused by volatile inflation. It provides 
them with higher incentives to participate in the CSH system, too. 
However, the link to the refinancing rate is not the very best solution of the problem, 
because the uncertainty of long-term contracts can only be eliminated (especially in 
the case of Belarus) through fixed interest rates. Thus, the most general requirement 
for the appropriate and stable functioning of a CSH system in Belarus is to promote 
disinflation and macroeconomic stability. 
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4.4. Government subsidies and incentives for depositors 
A well-designed CSH system should work without any external support, as the incen-
tives for all participants could be distorted by external subsidies7. Yet, in countries 
with low confidence in the banking system, such as Belarus, the government may 
have to subsidize households (especially those with middle incomes) in order to at-
tract them into the CSH system. 
The method of calculating the government subsidy proposed in the draft law is rather 
complicated for households. The definition “1991 prices” is unclear for most house-
holds, because it is only used in the construction. An additional possible problem (for 
psychological reasons) is that many people associate the year 1991 with loosing their 
savings in Sberbank8. As a result, to define the state subsidy in this way can reduce 
its effectiveness as a tool to attract households into the system. 
Another obstacle that should be abolished is the dependence of the size of the pre-
mium on inflation. We propose to fix the size of the government premium at a pre-
determined level (e.g. 25% of the yearly deposited amount9). Instead of imposing a 
limit on the size of the subsidized deposit it would be better to limit the annual 
amount of the subsidy. The maximum subsidy amount should be defined in Belarusian 
Rubles or another currency of deposit instead of “1991 rubles”. In this case, no infla-
tion definition would be needed in the draft law. Additionally, once the system starts 
to work efficiently, the government premium could be reduced or eliminated10. 
4.5. Selected principles of supervision 
Since the Belarusian housing savings banks will be universal banks, they should be 
supervised by the NBB according to the banking legislation. The draft law envisages 
this. But we propose to add the following stipulations. Firstly, the supervision should 
approve the types of contracts allowed within the CSH system (with and without a link 
to the refinancing rate). Secondly, the requirement according to which “the supervi-
sion should reveal whether deposits in real terms11 are not decreased” should be 
eliminated, as well as the inflation definition itself. The same supervision procedures 
as for other types of deposits must exist. 
5. Conclusions and recommendations 
1) The CSH law should create only a general legislative framework; issues of interest 
rates setting, supervision, and government subsidization should be contained in regula-
tions issued by the NBB, the Ministry of Finance, or other governmental bodies responsi-
ble for these issues. 
2) The CSH system in Belarus should be organized as a closed system offered through 
the universal banks with a segregated section in the bank’s balance sheet for CSH op-
erations. 
3) Banks should have the possibility to enter into CSH contracts with fixed interest 
rates for the whole term of the contract. In addition, in order to reduce the risks of 
high/volatile inflation a linkage between the nominal loan interest rate and the refi-
nancing rate should be envisaged. Supervision must approve the types of CSH con-
tracts permitted. 
                                                 
7 But in the great majority of countries the state provides support to households that participate in CSH systems. 
8 All household savings in Sberbank (Savings Bank) of the USSR completely lost their value due to high inflation and 
due to peoples’ inability to buy any goods for this money (very few goods – especially durables – being available at 
that time). 
9 The sizes of the premiums provided at the beginnings of the CSH systems in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia varied from 25 to 40% of the annual deposits, while a maximum subsidy size was imposed. 
10 This, however, is quite unlikely, because the experience of most countries with successful CSH systems shows that 
they retain their state supports despite the successes of their systems. Of course, any attempt to reduce this support 
meets with strong resistance from the households. 
11 According to the inflation definition in the draft law. 
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4) The sizes, maximum amounts, and schedules of the available state subsidies 
should be clearly defined in the legislation. All references to “1991 prices” should be 
eliminated; no inflation definition is needed in the law. 
5) As housing savings banks in Belarus can be only universal banks, they should be 
supervised by the NBB according to the banking legislation without any specific provi-
sions. 
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